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The Tree of Language 
Giorgio Agamben 
 
Translated by Connal Parsley1 
 
 
The path traced by the essays collected here leads us to the widest possible vantage 
over the problems of contemporary linguistics.2 Linguistics, today, has begun to 
occupy a privileged place amongst the disciplines; seeming to promise a 
methodological model for every kind of inquiry, from ethnology to literary 
criticism. Setting out along this path, therefore, the reader must inevitably consider 
the question: what is linguistics? To borrow the opening words of the Course in 
General Linguistics that, for better or for worse, has long enjoyed an unusual level 
of prestige: what is ‘the science that has been developed around the facts of 
language’?3 
That linguistics really is the science of language is taken as self-evident; 
something that need not detain our thinking. According to current opinion, this 
just means that as a science, linguistics takes ‘language studied in and for itself’ as 
its ‘true and unique object’;4 where the phrase ‘in and for itself’ reflects the objective 
character of modern scientific method as it has been constructed from the sixteenth 
century to today. But is such a scientific contemplation of the ‘facts of language’ 
really possible? We know that in 1927, when he needed to explain the impossibility 
of knowing with precision both the position and the momentum of a quantum 
particle, the German physicist Werner Heisenberg had to introduce what he called 
the Uncertainty Principle. According to this notion, every time a scientist observes 
or measures a given physical system, an interaction is produced between observer 
and system that results in the distortion of the phenomenon being observed. If we 
consider the mechanism that has made the birth of linguistics as a science possible, 
we may be tempted to ask whether a similar phenomenon also lies at the 
foundation of the study of language, and whether, as a result, the idea of language 
as a whole considered ‘in and for itself’ isn’t merely one more myth amongst the 
many that accompanied the birth of nineteenth century science. 
Saussure — who thought himself the first to transport linguistics from the 
utopian realm into the realm of science (just as Marx did with socialism) — informs 
                                                     
1 The translator would like to thank Giorgio Agamben, Kevin Attell, and Peter Goodrich. Special 
thanks to Michael Lewis for both invaluable editorial and bibliographical assistance, and 
substantive comments that have improved this translation. 
2 For a full list of the contents of the journal in which this article originally appeared, please 
consult the Italian version of the text that immediately precedes the translation. — Ed. 
3 Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics (Columbia University Press, 2011), 1. 
4 Ibid., 232. 
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us that if he has, for the first time, ‘succeeded in assigning linguistics a place among 
the sciences’ it is because he has ‘related it to semiology’.5 Linguistics could be cast 
as a science, that is, only by defining its object as a system of signs — a coherent 
whole made up of entities, each characterised by the indivisible union of two 
elements, the signifier and the signified (signans and signatum). In other words, the 
birth of linguistics as a science coincides with the definitive entry of language into a 
semiological sphere, without remainder. The ‘distortion’ that is produced by the 
interaction between the scholar and the object-phenomenon in question is, in this 
case, the reduction of language to a system of signs. In truth, this distortion is 
imperceptible. This is so because, according to a definition that has barred our 
access to a more essential reflection on linguistic problems for almost two thousand 
years (but which has only now, in our time, acquired a normative significance), 
language is phônê sêmantiké, a sonic emission that signifies. Contrary to a mistaken 
belief that endured for some time, this definition of language was in no way 
Saussure’s discovery. Already implicit in Aristotle’s On Interpretation, it was 
comprehensively elaborated by the Stoic philosophers, who regarded the sêmeion 
as an entity comprised of the inseparable connection between a sensible sêmainon 
and an intelligible sêmainomenon. Saussure merely made this relation normative, 
and thus silencing any other characterisation of language that might have been 
equally prevalent in Greek thought, arrived at a consideration of the laws of 
language from both a synchronic perspective (the state of a language at a 
determinate moment) and a diachronic one (from the point of view of its evolution 
in time). In this way, he preserved the illusion of analysing language scientifically 
‘in and for itself’, forgetting that ‘la langue envisagée en elle même et pour elle 
même’ is something very much like a phantasm. Any inquiry into language must 
take root not in the pure fact of language, but in an object that is already itself the 
product of philosophical reflection: in this case, language considered or indeed pre-
judged to be a system of signs. 
Since Saussure, this characterisation of language-as-sign has become the 
foundation of all linguistic inquiry, and is accepted as incontestable dogma even by 
those who take an avowedly critical stance towards his work. As Jakobson wrote, 
‘modern structuralist thought has clearly established [that] language is a system of 
signs, and linguistics is part of the science of signs, or SEMIOTIC (Saussure’s 
sémiologie). The ancient definition of the sign — ‘aliquid stat pro aliquot’ — has 
been resurrected and proposed as still valid and productive’.6 
 
 
If we now reply, to the question we posed at the outset, that linguistics is the science 
that studies language considered as a system of signs — an answer that no longer 
seems quite so obvious — then a question immediately arises concerning the 
                                                     
5 Ibid., 16. 
6 Roman Jakobson, Selected Writings Volume II, Word and Language (Mouton de Gruyter, 
1971), 103. 
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concrete aims assumed by any such science. Here, too, the answer is apparently 
straightforward: linguistics, it is said, seeks the laws of language, both synchronic 
and diachronic, in the sense we have described. But what does it mean to search 
for the laws of a given phenomenon, or of a system? We are so used to representing 
reality as a system governed by laws (that is, representing it ‘rationally’) that we no 
longer even ask what this expression might mean, to ‘seek the laws of language’. 
The word ‘rationally’, in fact, helps us to find an answer. Scientific 
investigation (but also our modern way of thinking generally and indeed the very 
possibility of the existence of something like ‘laws’) is based on a principle that was 
not clearly articulated until the eighteenth century, with the expression principium 
rationis. Leibniz, who was extremely proud of his discovery, formulated it thus: 
nihil est sine ratione. Nothing is without reason: this means that nothing in the 
universe exists whose reason cannot be given, or as the expression of the time had 
it, nothing exists for which we cannot reddere rationem. To reason means, in fact, 
to search for and to provide reasons — to name the real by giving to it its reason. 
Linguistics, as a science, therefore seeks the reason of language, summoning 
language ad rationem reddendam. In Greek, ratio, or reason, is logos. But logos is 
also the name that the Greeks gave to language itself. As such, Aristotle’s most 
celebrated definition of man as zôon logon ekhon means both that man is ‘the 
animal who has reason’ and ‘the animal who has language’. 
Among the first thinkers to pose language’s problems in a radically new way 
was Johann Georg Hamann, whom Hegel and Goethe both held in very high 
regard. As he wrote in a letter to Johann Gottfried Herder: ‘Even if I were as 
eloquent as Demosthenes, I should not have to do more than thrice repeat a single 
phrase: Reason is language, logos. This is the bone I gnaw at, and shall gnaw myself 
to death over. Yet these depths are still obscure to me; I still await an apocalyptic 
angel with a key to this abyss’.7 If this is true — if logos is language, if reason and 
language are the same thing — then how would it be possible to discover the reason 
of language? If nothing is without reason, then reason maintains itself beyond the 
reach of its own principle in any case: that which founds is necessarily without 
foundation. Understood as reason, language thus ends up revealing an abyss that it 
forces us to circle for eternity. Like Angelus Silesius’ rose, language is ‘without why, 
it / blooms because it blooms, / It pays no attention to itself, / asks not whether it is 
seen’. 
In this way, to enquire after the nature of linguistic science leads us to call into 
question the very possibility of linguistics itself, insofar as it is a science that seeks 
the reason of language and hopes to oblige language to justify itself rationally. Yet 
if it is true that questioning is the piety of thought — if our question leads us, that is, 
to ask ‘what is language?’ in a more originary sense — then we will also have been 
led to a place where we can hear the specific resonance of the essays gathered here. 
                                                     
7 Ronald Gregor Smith, J. G. Hamann (1730–1788) A Study in Christian Existentialism: With 
Selections from His Writings (Harper and Brothers, 1960), 246. 
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We can then pose the question once more, in its fullest sense: what is linguistics? 
What is the science that has been developed around the facts of language? 
 
 
To what does linguistics owe its privileged place among the sciences? To answer 
this question we must return to the biblical myth of the origin of language. In the 
story of Genesis, language’s origin is presented thus: ‘Now the Lord God had 
formed out of the ground all the wild animals and all the birds in the sky. He 
brought them to the man to see what he would name them; and whatever the man 
called each living creature, that was its name’.8 We know nothing more of this 
original language of humanity, Adamic language. But we can deduce, from the 
words of Genesis, that it was a kind of nomenclature whose aim was to guarantee 
man’s dominion ‘over the fish in the sea and birds in the sky and over ever living 
creature that moves on the ground’ that God promised him at the moment of 
creation. 
When Adam was banished from the garden of Eden and his descendants 
began to people the earth, humanity retained this original language. The power of 
Adamic naming must have been truly remarkable if, according to Genesis, God 
had to confound it in order to prevent humans from erecting the tower at Babel 
that reached ‘to the heavens’: ‘The Lord said, “If as one people speaking the same 
language they have begun to do this, then nothing they plan to do will be impossible 
for them. Come, let us go down and confuse their language so they will not 
understand each other”’.9 
Towards the second half of the eighteenth century, driven by nostalgia for the 
mythical power of Adamic language, philosophers and linguists posed themselves 
the problem of the nature of human language before the confusion of languages at 
Babel. Even whilst they were arranging the very foundations of modern science, 
these thinkers understood that the problem of knowledge was inextricably linked 
to that of language, and they thought that if man could rediscover the language of 
Babel then no further obstacle could be placed in the way of science’s march 
toward the acquisition of truth. 
The Jesuit mathematician Athanasius Kircher — and also, independently, 
John Wilkins and George Dalgarno — realised that although it is impossible to 
return to Adamic language via an analytic examination of known natural languages, 
it is nonetheless possible to construct an artificial language that possesses the same 
characteristics. Such a language would be universal, in the sense that it could be 
understood and spoken by all humankind. It would also, for that reason, be 
rational, in the sense that once its primary or irreducible characters or signs are 
discovered (its ‘philosophical grammar’), then the entire logical-linguistic universe 
would emerge from these signs through a system of implicit rules of transformation 
                                                     
8 Genesis 2,19 (New International Version). 
9 Genesis 2, 4-6. 
The Tree of Language 
 16 
— more or less like that of natural numbers, thanks to which we know without even 
thinking that 2 + 1 = 3. In a letter to Marin Mersenne of 20th November 1629, 
asking himself whether such a ‘philosophical’ language is possible, Descartes 
realised that the possibility of its creation depended on ‘la vraye philosophie’, 
because it presupposed the possibility of establishing an alphabet made up of all 
the basic ideas of the human mind, from which all the possibilities of reasoning 
could be derived. 
Pursuing this path via a method he termed ‘analytic-synthetic’, Kircher came 
to construct a true and proper tree of Reason. Proceeding from its base up a vertical 
trunk and along its horizontal branches, this tree condensed within itself the entire 
universe of logic, supplying the elemental structure of every possible knowledge. 
At that point, it remained only to assign each of these primary elements an 
appropriate sign, so that the tree of Reason would be transformed into a tree of 
Language and man would come into possession of a perfect equivalent of the 
language of Babel. Encountering the research conducted by Kircher, Wilkins and 
Dalgarno, it dawned on Leibniz that a certain problem must be resolved in order 
to make this transition from the tree of Reason to the tree of Language — and thus 
to construct the universal language that would throw open the portals to knowledge 
that were closed at Babel. What was to be discovered was the rational nexus that 
binds the sign to the thing it represents (that binds the signifier to the signified, we 
would say today). In his words: ‘there ought to be a reason why certain words are 
assigned certain things’ (causas subesse oportet, cur certae voces certis rebus sint 
assignate).10 This is why Leibniz strove his entire life to develop a science (the 
‘characteristica universalis’ or ‘spécieuse générale’ ), which — more than two 
centuries before Saussure’s general science of signs — would have revealed to man 
the ‘reason’ that binds sign and thing: ‘[s]ince it is this Characteristic which gives 
words to languages, letters to words, numbers to Arithmetic, notes to Music. It 
teaches us how to fix our reasoning, and to require it to leave, as it were, visible 
traces on the paper of a notebook for inspection at leisure. Finally, it enables us to 
reason with economy, by substituting characters in the place of things’.11 
In 1702, at seventy years of age, Leibniz transcribed and annotated Dalgarno’s 
Lexicon Grammatico-philosophicum, the title of which, for evident reasons, is 
worth transcribing here in full: ‘Grammatical-Philosophical Lexicon, or 
Methodically organised Table of all simple and general Things and Notions, both 
natural and artificial, including their Causes and Common relations; whose 
meanings are assigned names, not arbitrarily but with art and intelligence, 
preserving the analogical relation between Thing and Sign. From these Things and 
Notions are then formed, by general and clear rules and according to logical-
                                                     
10 Marcelo Dascal, Leibniz. Language, Signs, and Thought: A Collection of Essays (John 
Benjamins Publishing Company, 1987), 189. 
11 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Leibniz: Selections (Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1951), 4. 
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grammatical analogy, all other, more complex names, either by deduction or by 
combination in one or more entries’.12 
 
 
The reason we have given careful attention to Kircher and Leibniz’s research, and 
to the full title of Dalgarno’s treatise, is the fact that they announce — either 
explicitly or implicitly — the fundamental themes of present-day linguistics. Even 
the lay reader will be aware that with the publication of Noam Chomsky’s 1957 
Syntactic Structures, contemporary linguistics enters a true and proper upheaval, 
suddenly throwing into question every article of faith held by linguists. What was 
the point of departure for the enquiry made by this new school of linguistics? 
Chomsky himself declares his debt to the rationalist current of thought of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Although he seems to neglect Kircher and 
Dalgarno, as well as Leibniz’s writing on rational language, he often cites Descartes 
and other works by Leibniz, and refers explicitly to the Port-Royal philosophers’ 
universal grammar. According to Chomsky, every speaking subject acts as if, 
inherent in their res cogitans, there were a kind of generative code capable of 
establishing connections between semantemes and phonemes in an indefinite 
number of possible combinations. Everything happens as if, in other words, every 
language had a generative grammar that could account for any possible phrase, by 
reference to a base of minimal structures and a defined system of rules for their 
transformation — encompassing a phrase’s semantic content as well as its 
phonological structure. 
A generative grammar, understood in this way, can be compared with the well-
known children’s toy, Junior Engineer. This consists of (A) a nucleus of primitive 
elements; base materials that are the building blocks for the manufacture of new 
objects, (B) instructions setting out the steps that should be followed in order to 
construct new objects from the base materials, and (C) structural designs for making 
particular objects. Seen in this way, a startling analogy emerges between generative 
grammar and the philosophical tree of language elaborated by Kircher and 
Dalgarno’s Lexicon Grammatico-philosophicum — which were also generative 
linguistic systems. 
The analogy becomes even more pronounced if we bear in mind that 
Chomsky, and the other theorists of this new linguistic school, did not attempt to 
                                                     
12 Tabulae Rerum, et Notionum omnium Simpliciorum, et Generaliorum, tam Artefactarum 
quam Naturalium, Rationes, et Respectus communiores, Methodo Praedicamentali ordinatas, 
complectentes: Quibus significandis, Nomina, non Casu, sed Arte, et Confilio, servata inter Res 
et Signa convenientia Analogica, instituuntur. Ex quibus, Rerum et Notionum aliarum omnium 
magis Complexarum et specialorum Nomina, vel Derivatione, vel Compositione, in una vel 
pluribus vocibus, per Regulas quasdam Generales et certas, secundum Analogiam Logico-
Grammaticam, formantur; Ita ut Nomina sic formata, Rerum Descriptiones ipsarum Naturae 
consentaneas, contineant. — Trans. 
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deduce the generative grammars of existing natural languages through a process of 
analysis. Instead, they arrived at the construction of purely abstract generative 
grammars by a procedure they termed ‘analysis by synthesis’ — whose very name 
recalls Kircher’s analytic-synthetic method. Such grammars are like ‘logical 
machines’ that provide the structural description of theoretical and virtual 
languages, just like the philosophical language of the seventeenth century 
rationalists. 
Turning to the other aspect of Leibniz and Dalgarno’s research — the 
necessary relation that must exist between sign and thing (or signifier and signified) 
— this finds its precise correlate in the other great current of contemporary 
structural linguistics: Jakobson’s critique of Saussure’s theory of the arbitrariness of 
the sign. Without entering into the detail of this critique here (which would barely 
be comprehensible to any reader not versed in linguistic theory), we may 
nonetheless recall that in Plato’s Cratylus, Socrates and Hermogenes discussed the 
question of whether, in language, a form should be considered to be related to its 
content ‘by nature’ (physei) or ‘by convention’ (thesei). In the dialogue, Socrates 
favours the first answer, and Hermogenes the second. 
In modern linguistics, it is Hermogenes’ thesis that has prevailed. And 
Saussure, albeit with some hesitation, eventually established a true and proper 
theory of the arbitraire du signe. Roman Jakobson, on the contrary — taking up 
themes already signalled by Otto Jesperson, as well as C. S. Peirce, an American — 
vindicates Socrates’ answer, making it the foundation of a series of brilliant analyses 
in which the emphasis is shifted, in the examination of linguistic phenomena, from 
language’s lexical aspect to its structural quality. 
A careful examination thus reveals that the second fundamental theme of 
contemporary linguistics — alongside the theory of generative grammar — is 
precisely the construction of the characteristica universalis sought by Leibniz: the 
science that would allow the establishment of a rational connection between sign 
and thing. 
In 1677, at 31 years of age, Leibniz penned a ‘Dialogue’ on the method that 
would permit the calculation — a complete calculation, for everything that exists — 
of the relation between the word, the sign and the thing. In this essay, as Heidegger 
noted,13 Leibniz laid the logical foundations for what we know today as artificial 
neural networks and cybernetic machines. In the margin of the text may be a found 
a note, made by Leibniz himself, which reads: Cum deus calculat, fit mundus: ‘As 
God calculates, the world arises’. Divine ‘calculation’ is the secret reason written 
into the universe; and into human language, that man may realise his every project 
and assume dominion over the earth. 
If linguistics currently occupies a privileged place among disciplines it is 
because in seeking the reason of language, it makes possible the construction of a 
universal method comparable to that of Leibniz’s rational language, which finds its 
                                                     
13 Martin Heidegger, The Principle of Reason (Indiana University Press, 1996), 101. 
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definitive elaboration in cybernetics and information theory. In contemporary 
linguistics, in other words, the phrase ‘language is reason’ is understood to mean 
‘language is calculation’: a logical machine that transforms information from one 
form into another by means of mathematical rules. And linguistics studies the 
operation of this calculation that supplies the rational structure for every possible 
knowledge. 
If this is true, then linguistics is not merely the science that takes as its object 
the facts of language. It is rather an appeal to language, asking that it conform to 
the all-pervasive demand of calculative reason and arrange itself in accordance with 
a universal calculus. From this point of view, the growing convergence between 
linguistic research, information theory and cybernetics assumes an extremely 
particular significance. The tree of language is in fact a branch of that ‘mathematical 
science of the soul’ (or mathematical psychology) which already proclaims itself the 
most important discipline of the immediate future, and to which universal linguistic 
calculus, information theory and cybernetics are but the precursor. 
 
 
We have seen that the quest for the reason of language has led linguistic research 
to renounce many of the postulates established by Saussure, developing instead a 
quasi-mathematical method. This method, to the extent that it recalls Kircher and 
Leibniz, no longer seems to have much in common with that of traditional 
linguistics. The growing importance assumed by abstract generative grammar 
theory, and the introduction of linguistic models, have induced many American 
universities to offer special courses in mathematics in order to provide the training 
necessary for linguistic study. Algebraic linguistics, given a marked boost by 
Chomsky’s theories, is decisively on the rise. 
From the very beginning of the history of linguistics to the present day, 
however, one linguistic postulate remains unexamined: the definition of language 
as a system of signs, understood as indissoluble unities of signifier and signified. 
Despite radical critiques by philosophers — who have recently even spoken of ‘the 
historical closure’ of the ‘age of the sign’14 — the dogma of the sign remains intact. 
In this sense, it can be said that contemporary linguistics remains faithful to 
Saussure’s semiological project to the very end. Language, for this project, remains 
phônê sêmantiké; a sonic emission that signifies something. The structure of this 
system of signs is understood as rational, in the sense that it is thought possible to 
articulate its reason in a formal model analogous to a formal mathematical theory. 
Hand in hand with this mathematisation of the study of language, we witness an 
ever more marked convergence between linguistics (which, as we have said, has 
become a branch of a broader mathematical theory of the soul) and cybernetics, 
together with information theory. (For this reason, it will not surprise the reader to 
find a chapter by Silvio Ceccato, a scholar of cybernetics, in the present volume 
                                                     
14 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 13. 
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dedicated to linguistics). The study of language as a ‘logical machine’, in fact — 
reproducing the traditional problem of the relation between language and thought 
in a new domain — usefully contributes to the resolution of the fundamental 
problem in cybernetics: the ‘modulation of human thought in the universal 
calculating machine’.15 
In this sense, linguistics seems to be on a path to realising the dreams of the 
rationalist philosophers, through the construction of a rational tree of language. Just 
like the Arbor philosophica universae cognitionis typus that Kircher drew at the 
end of his Arte magna del sapere, the trunk of this tree would rise out of the abyss 
of nothingness, stretch up to the heavens, and furnish us with the structural 
rationality of the entire logical universe. 
 
 
Alongside this possibility, however, another one presents itself. Disclosed at the 
dawn of Greek thought, it has remained in reserve, so to speak, within the history 
of the western meditation on language. If we consider language in accordance with 
the path opened up by this alternative possibility, language is logos — but logos does 
not simply mean ‘reason, calculation’. Instead, according to its etymology, logos 
designates the act of gathering, preserving and bringing something before the gaze 
so that it appears as what it is. Language, in this sense, is that which enables every 
thing to be gathered in itself and held before us, in the light of presence. This is 
why the Greeks said: to autò estin einai te kai logos, ‘being and language are the 
same’, and it is why they so readily understood the linguistic sign in light of its 
originary belonging to being. 
A fragment from Heraclitus expresses magnificently this ontological 
dimension of the sign: ‘The Lord of whom Delphi is the oracle, neither unveils nor 
hides, but signifies (sêmainei)’. This is to say, in the indissoluble unity of the 
linguistic sign, the Greeks glimpsed the mystery of being that appears in the sensible 
sign and thereby conceals itself, and in concealing itself, comes to appear. This dual 
nature of being is also expressed in the negative inflection they gave to truth: 
alêtheia, un-concealment, unveiling, and the mutual relation between appearance 
and being-concealed. 
The essence of language is not fully expressed, then, in its being a means of 
communication and expression — a signifying sound. Language’s semiological 
nature is merely a clue to the originary belonging of language to being. The 
semiological perspective that linguistics opens on language is, for this reason, 
accurate only to the extent that it opens onto a wider ontological dimension, since 
it is in language that humankind — that animal endowed with language — draws 
closer to the problem of its being in the world and recovers, time and again, its 
fundamental place in relation to Being. 
                                                     
15 Sebastian Konstantinovič Šaumjan, ‘Cybernetics and Language’ (1965) 13 (51) Diogenes 129, 
144. 
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The tree of language is the unity of the tree of life and the tree of knowledge, 
possessed by Adam in Eden but then denied to humanity by the confusion of 
languages at Babel. In this sense, humankind is always on the way to language. And 
linguistics — this ‘science that has been developed around the facts of language’ — 
serves its aims only if, while orienting humankind on the way toward language, it 





D. Today we are confronted by a variety of linguistics: linguistics as applied to machines in 
general, functional linguistics, various structuralisms, glossematics used by generative grammars, 
etc. From what point of view do you yourself approach the object ‘language’? 
R. From the point of view of its possible relation with mathematics. I think that by a 
perimathematical analysis one can bring to light certain characteristics of a style, and so of the 
literary enterprise in general. I am working in this direction, but I haven’t yet arrived at something 
like a ‘result’ and so I have not yet published anything. I am dedicating myself in particular to 
certain problems having to do with linguistic ambiguity, which I believe quantitative analysis is 
able to reveal more than any other method.  
 
From an interview with Raymond Queneau for Paesi Libri, 1968. 
 
